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Abstract 
This Major Qualifying Project encompasses an analysis of the United States defensive 
asylum process with the goal of providing information to assist decision makers for immigration 
policy. Currently, there are over one million pending immigration cases that include asylum 
seekers who are waiting for a hearing. Using data analysis, queuing theory, simulation, 
optimization, and regression analysis, the team developed a web-based tool with the purpose of 
aiding in resource allocation at the United States southern border. The results show a relationship 
between the independent variables: number of judges, interarrival time, and initial queue size, and 
the dependent variables: average waiting time and average queue size. The web tool takes these 
relationships and user input data to output a sector-by-sector allocation of judicial resources to 
minimize time in system, queue size, and costs. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Since 1965, the number of people immigrating into the United States has increased by over 
35 million people (Radford, 2019). Specifically, over the past decade more immigrants are seeking 
entry into the United States through the asylum process. An asylum seeker is a person who is 
claiming asylum at a United States port of entry or within the United States and must satisfy the 
United States Custom and Immigration Service (USCIS) definition of credible fear (USCIS, 2018). 
This means that the person must confirm they cannot return to their home country safely due to 
persecution or fear of persecution (American Immigration Council, 2019).  
After claiming asylum, asylum seekers are placed into two different categories. These are 
defined by the USCIS as affirmative and defensive, and only those who are classified as defensive 
will be examined in this project. Defensive asylum seekers are individuals who are facing removal 
proceedings or individuals who are claiming asylum at the United States border (“Defensive 
Asylum,” 2019). For both types of asylum seekers, the individual claiming asylum must show that 
they have a credible fear of returning to their country of origin. Those claiming defensive asylum 
must then justify their claim once more to an immigration judge. The total time of the asylum 
process can range from 6 months to several years (National Immigration Forum, 2019). Due to the 
increase in individuals seeking asylum,  the team sought to create a tool to allocate resources to 
mitigate the impacts of the overload. 
The team’s approach to analyzing the asylum process is primarily through queueing theory. 
Queueing theory aims to find the best way to allocate limited resources and expedite services in a 
waiting line (Gross, 2018). In relation to the asylum process, this can mean assigning an optimal 
number of judges, border patrol officers, and other officials as well as prescribing how many cases 
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can be processed over a period of time. This intends to reduce stress on the asylum queue by 
weighing the cost of servers against the cost of those waiting. Most studies regarding the asylum 
seeker and refugee processes focus on qualitative analyses of the experiences of these individuals. 
The key performance indicator used in this project is what is known as the traffic intensity. Traffic 
intensity is the ratio between the arrival rate of the customers, in this case asylum seekers, over the 
product of the number of servers and the service rate of the system, in this case the asylum process. 
Using the results of queueing theory analysis, the team utilized simulation to gain a better 
understanding of the process flow of the entire system and identify areas for improvement. The 
team employed simulation to grasp how the system operates and try a wide range of scenarios 
without affecting the actual system itself. Using data gathered from simulation and the Department 
of Homeland Security, the team utilized optimization, the process of making the most effective 
use of resources through mathematical modeling. By optimizing, the team found a possible ideal 
state for the asylum-seeking process, thereby decreasing stress on the process. 
Using knowledge of the current state, data, and history of the asylum seeker process in the 
United States, our goal was to develop a web-based tool for resource allocation that is versatile for 
multiple systems present at the border using optimization and queuing theory. Ultimately, this tool 
would allocate resources to each sector by using optimization and queuing theory, analyzing the 
current state of the system, and incorporating all costs to help inform policy for process 
improvement. By considering the factors affecting asylum seekers, as well as economic and 
resource barriers, this research presents a deliverable that is useful for all stakeholders involved. 
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2.0 Background 
To properly assess any system, it first must be understood on a comprehensive level. 
Intensive research encompassing asylum seekers, government agencies, and various industrial 
engineering concepts, was conducted. Using this knowledge allowed for an improved 
understanding of the asylum seeker process.  
2.1 Asylum Seeker and Refugee Policy and Stakeholders 
The definitions, processes, and agencies applicable to either asylum seekers or refugees 
entering the United States differ significantly. This section will define both types of immigrants 
and describe the main federal agencies that are involved in the defensive asylum seeker process. 
2.1.1 Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States 
It is important to note the differences between immigrants who are asylum seekers and 
those who are refugees. The basic definitions are similar at first glance, but the process for each 
group is independent and unique.  
Refugees in the United States 
According to Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 
Geneva, the definition of a refugee is: 
“A person who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection 
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
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habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it” (United Nations 1951). 
The number of refugees globally has increased substantially by nearly 10 million from 
2012 to 2017 (American Immigration Council, 2019). The President of the United States, in 
consultation with Congress, determines the refugee admission ceiling that will be approved each 
year. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State are the agencies 
that assess both the diversity and capacity of refugees that the United States can take in. 
Refugees are often staged for long periods of time in camps outside of their country of 
origin. The average processing time for a refugee to undertake the screening process to be eligible 
for the resettlement program has been estimated to be about 18-24 months (American Immigration 
Council, 2019). 
Asylum Seekers in the United States 
An asylum seeker in the United States is similar to a refugee, however, the process to be 
considered an asylee is different from the process for a refugee. To receive asylum, for each case, 
every person must first fulfill the requirements as stated in the United States law definition of 
“refugee,” as stated above. The differing qualification between the two terms is the location of the 
person at the time of application. Refugees are located outside of the United States while they wait 
to be screened and vetted for resettlement, while asylum seekers are present in the United States 
or at a United States border entry point during this time (American Immigration Council, 2018). 
There are some challenges that asylum seekers face throughout the process. As of July 
2018, the average wait time for an initial hearing with an immigration judge was 721 days 
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(National Immigration Forum, 2019). Another significant challenge that apprehended asylum 
seekers may experience is being held in detention facilities during part or all of their waiting 
period. In the latest release from the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
in 2016, 20,455 total cases for asylum were approved. However, as of March 2018, there are over 
318,000 applications that are still pending with USCIS which includes asylum seeker applicants 
anywhere in the process who have filed the initial form (American Immigration Council, 2019). 
2.1.2 United States Agency Stakeholders 
Every quarter, the USCIS hosts a meeting called the “Asylum Division Stakeholder 
Meeting” (USCIS, 2019). These updates give an overview of the current practices being followed 
at border entry points and allow the general public to get a better idea of how policies that are new, 
changing, or their implementation process. It is a completely public event where anyone is allowed 
to attend. There are also statistical reports from the last few months along with their various 
workloads. 
Presidential Administration 
On January 25, 2017, the Federal Register (2017), the official journal of the United States 
government for rules, laws and policies, records President Donald Trump’s submission of an 
executive order named “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements.” 
Within the first executive order on Customs and Border Protection (CBP), President Trump 
describes the purpose of the order being to address issues of “drug- and human-networks and 
smuggling operations” which contribute to an increase in “violent crime and United States deaths.” 
The three main areas of change in this order are: (1) the construction of a border wall, (2) an 
increase in construction of detention facilities, and (3) a stronger limit to asylum access. There was 
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no specific funding identified in the executive order for the detention facilities (Center for 
Migration Studies, 2017). For the limits on the process, the approach comes from a term known as 
“expedited removal” (Executive Office of the President, 2017). However, in a study from the 
United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, it was found that “expedited 
removal” may not be applied fairly as the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) “has not developed a form that documents the decision-making process for parole” (Brandal, 
2005). 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security in the United States is “to secure the 
nation from the many threats we face” (Department of Homeland Security, 2019). The DHS is the 
main department involved in immigration at the United States southern border. Although there are 
other agencies involved in immigration, there are three main agencies under the Department of 
Homeland Security that are described below (Georgetown Law Library, 2019): 
● United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 
● United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), and 
● United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 
The role of each will be defined in the following sections. 
United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
The United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency was created in March 
2003. Prior to the formation of CBP, the various responsibilities of border protection were divided 
between five different agencies. Most notably, CBP absorbed the responsibilities of the United 
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States Customs Service, integrated immigration inspectors from the Office of the Superintendent 
of Immigration, and Border Patrol agents who, up until the creation of CBP, acted independently. 
Additionally, CBP employs forensic scientists, international trade specialists and public affairs 
officers. The main goal by combining these various agencies was to provide more structure while 
maintaining and protecting the United States’ borders and legal ports of entry (CBP, 2019).  
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) 
The USCIS is a “federal agency that provides immigration-related services and benefits” 
(Georgetown Law Library, 2019). The USCIS plays a large role as one of the primary 
organizations with which asylum seekers interact. The USCIS mainly provides the following 
services: citizenship, immigration of family members, working in the United States, humanitarian 
programs, adoption, civic integration, and genealogy services. These services are provided through 
various facilities across the country and through their website. One important fact to note is that 
there is no explicit service aiding in the process for claiming asylum. However, this appears to fall 
under the humanitarian program category of the USCIS as they explain that these programs are to 
provide protection for people who are “forced to flee their countries to escape the risk of death and 
torture at the hands of persecutors” (USCIS, 2018). The USCIS also provides guidelines for policy 
changes and collects data on the asylum process reported on a yearly basis. One example is 
guidelines for Detention and Removal of Aliens for credible fear interviews which was sent out in 
January of 2010 (USCIS, 2009). 
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
During the Department of Homeland Security’s reorganization in 2002, many new 
agencies were formed through mergers of other agencies. This reorganization created the 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), taking on responsibilities from both the United 
States Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Officially opening in 
March 2003, ICE was created with the intention of strengthening national security and public 
safety. ICE is divided into three groups to accomplish this task. The first section is the Enforcement 
and Removal Operations. This group works to uphold United States immigration law, seeking to 
remove those who are not in compliance with current immigration standards. The second section 
of ICE is the Homeland Security Investigation group. This group investigates foreign threats such 
as smugglers, human traffickers, and organized crime to better help foreign governments, and 
along with the United States Government, combats these threats.   The last section is the Office of 
the Principal Legal Advisor. This is a legal team, consisting of 1,100 attorneys, that represents the 
Department of Homeland Security in all formal removal hearings. Together these sections make 
up ICE (ICE, 2019). 
2.2 Asylum Process 
The asylum-seeking process is a complex system, aimed to grant asylum to those in need.  
The United States Government actively makes changes and improvements to ensure the largest 
number of asylum seekers are granted asylum. The following section outlines the types of asylum 
and the processes that follow them.  
2.2.2 Federal Resources Needed For Asylum Claims 
To conduct this process, the United States Government needs certain trained professionals 
to help facilitate the process. 
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Asylum Officer 
These are USCIS employees who physically conduct interviews. They are responsible for 
making the decision if an applicant has a credible fear of unjust persecution in their home country. 
Additionally, they evaluate the conditions of various countries, current United States laws, and 
conduct background checks. These officers are also trained to handle cases involving children 
(USCIS, 2014). 
USCIS Application Support Center 
These are USCIS offices that aid in the completion of the initial packet and fingerprinting 
procedures. These can be found in every state and are staffed with USCIS officials with extensive 
knowledge of the asylum process (“Obtaining Asylum,” 2015). 
Immigration Judges 
These are judges that hear defensive asylum cases. They determine whether an individual 
has a credible fear and meets the definition of a refugee. Immigration judges are overseen by the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a subsection of the United States Department 
of Justice (About the NAIJ 2019).    
Board of Immigration Appeals 
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is a part of the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review. They are the final say in all immigration cases. The twenty-one members of the BIA hear 
appeals from individuals denied asylum. These members of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
were all appointed by Attorney Generals and have experience in immigration law as either an 
immigration judge or a lawyer. To make their decisions, the BIA uses only written testimonies to 
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make their decision, as opposed to the courtroom setting immigration judges use (Board of 
Immigration Appeals, 2018). 
2.2.3 Affirmative Asylum Process 
Once an individual has arrived in the United States, they are eligible to enter the affirmative 
asylum process. The individual has one year from their entry to the United States to gain their 
application for “Asylum and for Withholding of Removal” packet. This packet is the first step in 
starting the affirmative asylum process. It covers basic background information about the applicant 
along with a description of their fear. Once the applicant has completed the packet, they are asked 
to send the packet to the USCIS Service Office in Nebraska.  Upon receiving the packet, USCIS 
will inform the applicant to visit their nearest application support center to be fingerprinted and go 
through a standard background and security check.  
After the paperwork is filed and received, the applicant is added to the interview queue. 
This queue follows a last-in-first-out priority system. Applicants are then given a priority level that 
determines when their hearing will be scheduled. The higher priority levels are granted hearings 
before the lower priority levels. As of January 29th 2018, the following are the definitions of the 
priority levels according to the USCIS.  
First Priority 
These applicants were previously granted an interview. However, the interview was 
rescheduled either from the USCIS or the applicant’s request. 
Second Priority 
These applicants have been in the queue for twenty-one days or less since filing. 
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Third Priority 
These applicants have been in the queue for more than twenty-one days. Applications from 
this point forward are filing starting with newer applications and working towards older 
filings.  
Lastly, the interview is conducted and it is determined if an applicant has credible fear. 
After the interview is completed, an asylum officer will determine if the applicant is eligible for 
asylum. The asylum officer’s decision is then reviewed by a supervisory officer, to ensure the 
decision is in compliance with the law. Two weeks after the interview, the applicant can return to 
the asylum office to pick up their decision (The Affirmative Asylum Process, 2019). 
2.2.4 Defensive Asylum Process 
When an individual arrives at the United States southern border or is apprehended by 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the individual is eligible to apply for defensive 
asylum. Depending on the circumstances, the individual is placed into two different processes. If 
the individual claims asylum at a legal port of entry or is apprehended by CBP within 100 miles 
of the southern border, they are placed in the Expedited Removal Process.  If the individual is 
apprehended by ICE after entry, they are placed in the process of Administrative Removal or 
Reinstatement of Removal (Defensive Asylum, 2019). 
Expedited Removal Process 
When an individual enters the expedited removal process they are first detained in an 
immigration detention center. These asylum seekers placed into the expedited removal process are 
given a higher priority than other defensive asylum claims. However, within the expedited removal 
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process itself, the queue follows first-in-first-out. Within two weeks of being in the expedited 
removal process, the individual is granted a credible fear interview (Overview of Asylum, 2019). 
This interview is to assess the fear the individual is facing and to ensure it fits the definition of a 
credible fear. This interview is conducted by an asylum officer to assess if the individual has a 
valid fear of being persecuted based on their race, gender, politics or nationality. This can be 
persecution from the government or the people of the individual's home country. Upon the 
completion of the interview, the individual is told whether or not they have a credible fear.  If they 
do not have a credible fear, the removal proceedings carry on. If they do have a credible fear, they 
are granted a hearing before an immigration judge (Overview of Asylum, 2019). 
Administrative Removal/Reinstatement of Removal 
When an individual is placed in administrative removal/reinstatement of removal, they are 
likely to be detained, although some will not be during this process. After that they are scheduled 
for a reasonable fear interview. This is conducted with a USCIS Officer. The purpose of this 
interview is to establish if the individual has a fear according to the same conditions of the credible 
fear interview, but has a higher standard of fear, that is, the fear must be more severe. If the 
individual is deemed to have a reasonable fear, they are granted a hearing before an immigration 
judge. If not, the removal process continues (Overview of Asylum, 2019). 
Hearing Before Immigration Judge 
If a credible or reasonable fear is found, the individual goes to a hearing before an 
immigration judge. This involves submitting evidence and providing witnesses to the judge to 
prove that the individual meets the requirements of a refugee under United States law. After the 
interview is conducted, the judge decides on whether the individual meets the requirements of 
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asylum. If again they are denied, the removal process advances however the asylum seeker may 
appeal the decision to the BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals, 2018) 
 
Figure 1. Defensive Asylum Process 
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2.3 Impacts of the Asylum Seeker Process 
There are many ways in which the stakeholders of the asylum-seeking process can be 
affected. To portray the impacts of this process, we have decided to divide them into economic, 
societal, and political impacts. For economic impacts, we explore immigration from an 
overarching perspective. In this discussion, we include not only asylum seekers, but also those that 
want to immigrate with the intention of improving their future career outlook. For societal impacts, 
we explore individual and cultural factors. Finally, for political impacts, we explore the effects of 
policy regarding immigration in international relations. 
2.3.1 Economic Impacts 
According to Dixon & Rimmer (2009), arguments against freer international mobility of 
labor revolve around three main claims and an underlying result if the claims were to be true. First, 
that immigrants are a possible burden for the economy of the country. Second, that they will 
potentially increase unemployment. Third, that they will definitely decrease wage rates. Naturally, 
if these statements were true, they would result in a decrease in national productivity. 
The first claim is that immigrants are a burden for the economy of the country. However, 
the skill level of United States immigrants is not what one would expect. On a spectrum that goes 
from high school or less to college or more, immigrants in the United States are mostly located on 
the far ends of the spectrum (Peri, 2016). In 2004, internationals made up 23% of workers with no 
degree, 8 to 10% of high school and college graduates, as well as 30% of workers with doctorates 
in science, engineering and technology (Peri, 2007). Not only do immigrant workers constitute a 
minority amongst the population of unskilled workers, but there is a significant influx of highly 
skilled workers, contributing to the country’s “Brain Gain” (Breschi, et. al., 2017). An additional 
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benefit from this influx of scientific talent is the increased availability of people qualified to 
support an increase in technological innovation and advancement in the medical, engineering, and 
scientific fields. 
The second claim is that immigrants will increase unemployment. The general idea behind 
this claim is that as the developing nations add to the pool of workers, they will increase the supply 
of labor. An increase in supply increases the competitiveness for jobs. Because a common belief 
is that immigrants are willing to work for lower wages, other non-immigrant workers cannot 
compete for these jobs. One key study states that, “immigrants weekly income is about $681 while 
native-born Americans earn $837 a week” (Gillespie, 2016). However, this argument is 
misleading, which is why Peri (2007) divides the labor pool into two parts; low-skilled (say with 
less than a high school degree) and high-skilled (with a high school degree or more) workers. He 
argues that in the United States, 89% of the population belongs to the high-skilled pool while only 
11% is low-skilled. Furthermore, he explains how the fear of undocumented low-skilled labor 
entering the country is a misconception of economic terms. Peri (2007) argues that “the inflow of 
low-skilled workers generates competition for workers already in that group, but also increases the 
demand for high-skilled workers” to manage them. Therefore, the inflow of low-skilled labor is 
actually creating jobs that are usually taken by the 89% of the American high-skilled population. 
As for the 11% of low-skilled Americans, the increase in demand of higher managerial positions 
would allow them to compete for them because they have an advantage over the immigrants in 
terms of the proficiency of the language and the understanding of the culture. 
The third claim is that immigrants will decrease wage rates. This claim is linked to the 
previous one. The belief is that with a higher supply of workers, there will be more competition 
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for low-skilled workers, thus lowering wages. However, we see that “real wages in the United 
States have risen even as the labor force has doubled in size” (Peri, 2007). A study on the economic 
benefits of immigration reforms finds that “increased enforcement and reduced low-skilled 
immigration have a significant negative impact on the income of United States households” (Dixon 
& Rimmer, 2009). With minimum wage providing a barrier to prevent the infinite decrease of 
wages, people that move to the United States from developing countries aspire to acquire minimum 
wage, which can be up to seven times higher than in their native countries. As a result, John 
Maynard Keynes (1936) in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money argues that 
this cheaper labor in a country, decreases the cost of production of the goods and thus, raises the 
purchasing power of all types of workers alike. In addition to this, as the demand for high-skilled 
workers increases, their wages are pushed higher.  
The last argument is concerned with a decrease in productivity. Peri (2007) argues against 
this notion, stating “by preventing labor from working where it is most productive, immigration 
restrictions sharply reduce the potential output of the world economy” (Peri, 2007). A country is 
its most productive when there is freer mobility of labor because this allows the resources (in this 
case the workers), to be allocated where needed the most at the lowest possible cost, thus providing 
a larger benefit for consumers (Radcliffe, 2019).  
Deprivation Costs 
Experts in the field of Humanitarian Logistics (HL) work with objective functions that 
“provide the affected people with supplies necessary for their survival, and to alleviate where 
possible the human suffering caused by a lack of goods or services” (Shao et al., 2020). However, 
it is difficult to quantify human suffering. For this reason, in recent years, a new term has been 
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introduced and discussed in the field of HL: deprivation costs. Deprivation costs are defined as 
economic value estimates of the human suffering caused by the lack of access to a good or service 
(Holguín-Veras et al., 2013). Part of the definition of deprivation costs includes that they are 
expected to be: 
1. Monotonic, non‐linear, and convex with respect to the deprivation time. 
2. Associated with non‐additive demands and, possibly, hysteretic effects that reflect residual 
damage to the beneficiaries (Holguín-Veras et al., 2013). 
Deprivation costs are usually applied to aid populations affected by disasters and they are 
depicted as a function of time and characteristics of the entities. Time is considered because the 
longer a person is deprived from a good or service, the more the person is marginally affected by 
its absence. Characteristics of the entities are considered because one cannot expect the absence 
of that good of service to affect any person equally. To illustrate this concept, one can imagine 
someone who is being deprived of medical assistance after having a car accident. The deprivation 
cost will then depend on two things. First, on how much time it takes for help to arrive at the scene 
to provide assistance, with time zero being the time of the accident. Second, on the specific 
characteristics of the person that requires medical assistance. These characteristics may include 
age, gender, previous health conditions, severity of the accident and so on. A similar example and 
its numerical representation is examined by Delgado-Lindeman et. al. (2019), where cost functions 
for emergency ambulance services are derived from deprivation costs similar to those described 
above. 
Holguín-Veras et al., (2013) define two cases for deprivation cost functions. The first is 
the hysteretic case, where the deprivation creates effects that persist after the need is fulfilled and 
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the person is no longer deprived of the good or service. The second is the non‐hysteretic case, 
where once the need is fulfilled there are no residual effects on the individual. In a subsequent 
study, Holguín-Veras et al. (2016) explore mathematical estimations for the non‐hysteretic case. 
However, in projects as complex as those involving immigration detention, researchers might have 
to consider both hysteric and non-hysteric cases. 
Deprivation costs are specific to the good or service that a population is being deprived of, 
usually water, food, shelter, or medical assistance. However, there are studies that take into 
consideration an aggregate number of goods or services. Such is the case for Pradhananga et al. 
(2016) who developed a numerical analysis for multiple commodities with no assigned supply 
type. In said research, deprivation time is assumed to be proportional to the distance to be travelled 
to supply the goods. The team believes that if this was to be translated to the defensive asylum 
process, deprivation time would be proportional to time in detention. Considering deprivation 
costs, total costs in HL are the sum of the private (logistic costs) and external costs (deprivation 
costs), thereby forming social costs as the objective of HL (Shao et. al., 2020). The team recognizes 
that the objective function of this project can be expanded to include the deprivation costs that a 
person suffers from being detained an additional day, however, we determined that  deprivation 
costs were outside of the scope of this research. 
2.3.2 Societal Impacts 
In this section, we explore societal impacts from two different viewpoints: individual 
impacts and cultural impacts. Individual impacts encompass what a person goes through as they 
navigate the asylum-seeking process. Cultural impacts involve what happens in the United States, 
in the countries of origin, and in the transit countries throughout this process. 
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Individual Impacts 
“The United States government manages the largest immigration detention system in the 
world” -Detention Watch Network, 2015  
 The agency in charge of detention is the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
which works within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Currently, the United States 
government is using detention more often than ever as a way of dealing with undocumented 
immigrants entering the country. By doing this, the government can ensure the presence of said 
immigrants before the immigration court (Nolo, 2016). 
In August of 2019, the Trump Administration announced a new regulation with the purpose 
of allowing the government to “indefinitely detain migrant families who cross the border” (Hibel 
et. al., 2019). This would also ultimately cause the well-documented suffering of migrant children 
to be extended while they are held in detention centers (Hibel et. al., 2019). Before this regulation, 
the Flores Agreement was in place to ensure that children would have access to sanitary products, 
legal representation, and would not be held captive for longer than 20 days (Hibel et. al., 2019).  
The psychological effects of detention in individuals can last far beyond their release, and 
independent of the circumstances of which they are released. Detention is believed to “undermine 
their human dignity” and can “cause unnecessary suffering, with serious consequences for their 
health and wellbeing” (UNHCR, 2014). Besides the feelings of anxiety, fear and frustration that 
asylum seekers undergo throughout the process, other physical illnesses are more prone to spread.  
On top of this, children are also at risk of multiple traumas like witnessing or being victims 
of physical and sexual violence, loss and bereavement, parental separation, kidnapping and human 
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trafficking (Ngo et. al., 2019). The UNHCR (2014) argues that “detention of children is 
particularly serious due to the devastating effect it may have on their physical, emotional and 
psychological development, even if they are not separated from their families”. 
Cultural Impacts 
“Why is it so much more acceptable to stop labor from moving across political borders 
than to stop goods or capital?” -Peri, 2007 
 According to Giovanni Peri, the answer to that question is rooted in culture and ideology: 
society fears the loss of inherited traits, such as traditions and language, making the discussion of 
“who wins and who loses” from immigration a heated topic. 
People tend to be more driven by culture and ideology than they are by currently available 
economic facts. An example of political decisions being driven by the fear of the culturally 
unknown is found in the book Brexit; Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. In this book, 
Harold Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley show through survey data that the vote of 
Britain to leave the European Union (Brexit) was linked to opposition to immigration, rather that 
the so-called desire for “sovereignty” and feeling “left behind” by prosperous London. The 
consensus of academic research is that Brexit is attributed to the fear for immigration rather than 
political autonomy of the United Kingdom from the European Union (Goodhart et. al., 2018). 
Brunner et al. (2018) shows that because host countries are facing rising levels of social 
and cultural diversity, social tensions occur and in return, they stir up anti-immigration sentiments 
among native residents, even in the absence of any negative labor-market effects. The same study 
argues that some reasons why immigrants seem to threaten natives’ identity may be because they 
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speak a different language, have a distinct lifestyle, and because they adhere to cultural values and 
beliefs different from those of native residents. This threat may in turn manifest in negative 
attitudes towards immigration among native residents (Brunner et. al., 2018). 
However, the cultural impacts of immigration do not only extend to the host countries. The 
Museum of Contemporary Photography made an exhibition showing how cultural impacts of 
immigration also extend to the countries of origin. An example of this is how in the town of San 
Miguel Amatilan, in the state of Oaxaca, Mexico, “women have been forced to take over traditional 
male occupations such as building houses of adobe, mainly because the majority of the men have 
moved to the United States in search of work and many have not come back” (Slemmons, 2010).  
Finally, one should not ignore what happens to the people in the countries of transit and 
how they are affected by migrants. In 2018 a “caravan of immigrants” made its way from Central 
America to the United States. In Mexico, they were known to leave a “trail of trash” wherever they 
passed through. As they passed through Guanajuato, Mexico and camped there for a single night, 
a local newspaper reported that they left behind 11 tons of trash (Milenio Digital, 2018). In a 
similar way, another news outlet reported the caravan leaving behind between 30 and 40 tons of 
trash as it passed through Oaxaca, Mexico. This requires the state government to allocate resources 
to clean up after them and avoid infections to spread amongst the Mexican population (El Sol de 
México, 2018). These events divided people through opposing arguments, with some people being 
furious that migrants were “dirty, unfair, and unthankful” and associated them with negative 
connotations, while others disagreed, saying people were being hypocritical (Vanguardia, 2018).   
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2.3.3 Political Impacts  
In the United States, there has been an unprecedented number of immigrants requesting 
asylum in the past few years. In 2017, ICE detained 323,591 irregular immigrants, and in 2018 
held an average of 42,000 immigrants in their facilities (Sands, 2018). It is important to highlight 
that the action of seeking asylum is not an unlawful act and “detaining asylum-seekers for the sole 
reason of having entered without prior authorisation runs counter to international law” (UNHCR, 
2014). More importantly, as the UNHCR (2014) says “under international law, individuals have 
the right to seek asylum, and if they do so, to be treated humanely and with dignity”. At the same 
time, there is no international law enforcement entity, only key international institutions, such as 
the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). This causes questions of institutional power versus state power to emerge 
often (Johnson, 2017). Therefore, as stated by Weiner (1985), the issues raised by international 
immigration are no longer matters of the national government alone. 
2.4 Queueing Theory 
2.4.1 Definitions 
Queueing theory is the mathematical study of the congestion and delays of waiting in line (Kenton, 
2019). Lines, or queues, form when the resources needed to provide a service are limited in some 
way, usually by time or capacity constraints that are uncontrollable, or by predetermined limits. 
By definition, a queue is, “queues are often physical lines of people or things, they can also be 
invisible as with telephone calls waiting on hold” (Green, 2011) and a queueing system is made 
up of multiple queues as depicted below in Figure 2. Queueing theory analyzes queueing systems 
to find the best way to allocate these limited, service-providing resources.  
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Figure 2. Basic Queue and Basic Queuing System Illustration 
To do this, all parts of a queueing system must be examined, including the arrival process 
(measured by the time between arrivals), consumer behavior, and service type. The arrival process 
refers to how consumers arrive in a system; this could be at set time intervals or at random. 
Consumer behavior within a queue determines if consumers will remain in the queue until served, 
leave after a predetermined time, or refuse to enter the queue at all. Lastly, the service type is 
composed of level and discipline. The service level is how many consumers are serviced over a 
certain amount of time and the service discipline refers to how the next consumer to be serviced is 
chosen. Service disciplines may be very simple such as “first in, first out” (FIFO) which is very 
common and seen in many retail establishments. Alternatively, they can be complex in their 
priority ranking, where certain classifications of consumers receive priority over others. An 
example of this is as simple as customers with only a few items being able to access express lanes 
in grocery stores. 
A queueing system is composed of six parts and is typically described in a type of shorthand 
called Kendall Notation. Kendall Notation takes the form of A/B/C/D/E/F.  
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● “A” refers to the arrival process, being exponential random, also known as Markovian (M), 
determined at intervals or degenerate (D), or general non-exponential random (G).  
● “B” describes the server process, which takes the same notation as the arrival process.  
● “C” is the number of servers within a system.  
The “D/E/F” segment of Kendall Notation is occasionally omitted when the system follows 
a default process. When these cannot be assumed, they are denoted as follows: 
● “D” refers to the queue capacity, for which, the default is “infinite”. 
● “E” refers to the population size, for which, the default is “infinite”.  
● “F” refers to the queueing discipline. When the F is omitted, the assumption is that the 
queueing system follows a FIFO discipline.  
2.4.2 Previous Applications 
Queueing in immigration is a topic that does not appear to have been thoroughly 
researched. One exception is an investigation into this topic that was completed in Australia in 
2003. The researchers delved into whether or not the queueing system for those seeking refugee 
status in Australia was “fair.” This research found that although the original design of the queuing 
process was considered "fair,” exceptions occurred in practice (Gelber, 2003). For example, when 
immigrants enter Australia illegally, they are processed before those who apply offshore. In 
addition to this being unfair, this also adds to the backlog of applications, with some applications 
sitting in line for years before even being initially reviewed. In this system, when there is too much 
backup, the system closes to new arrivals. At one embassy, callers were met with an answering 
machine stating that they are not taking any incoming calls and all visa processing had been 
suspended (Gelber, 2003). The inefficiency of this system can be traced to the improper utilization 
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of the limited resources, such as those individuals who review applications. One way to address 
this issue is to apply optimization strategies to a queueing system. This research intends to analyze 
the queueing systems involving asylum seekers in the United States. 
One queueing system similar to the asylum process that has been heavily studied is the 
emergency department (ED) of hospitals. There are many parallels between ED’s and the 
immigration system at the United States southern border. For example, the consumers in both 
systems are categorized into different priority levels, creating a multi-class system. In this type of 
system, with different priority levels, some new arrivals are propelled to the front of the queue 
based on the severity of their situation. For example, an unaccompanied minor is given priority 
over an unaccompanied adult just as a patient with a life-threatening injury is given access to a 
doctor over someone who has a common cold. While the wait times in the immigration system are 
months or years instead of minutes or hours, the fundamental components of the system are similar. 
Additionally, it is very difficult to track the time that care providers spend with ED patients in 
relation to their total processing time; this leads to many assumptions and the need for individual 
analyses to be performed to create an appropriate queueing model (Green, 2006). The same is true 
with the immigration process: the time that asylum seekers spend waiting in limbo in relation to 
the time their case actually takes to process is not always closely monitored (Utržan, D. S., & 
Northwood, A. K., 2017). This can create difficulties in modeling a system, as accurate service 
times may not be available. 
 One instance where much of the needed data was readily available was in a study of an 
ED in Iran, physical resources such as CT scans and labs were not changeable or candidates to 
increase in terms of resources (Alavi-Moghaddam, 2012). This led to using Rockwell Arena 
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simulation software (a program that allows users to model different situations involving processes) 
to test staffing and scheduling changes within the ED as well as additions of different queueing 
systems. In this study, the addition of just one ICU bed decreased the workload of ICU nurses by 
11%. Additionally, hiring a singular specialized clerk decreased service time by 30% (Alavi-
Moghaddam, 2012). This shows how very small changes in a queueing system can alleviate 
bottlenecks and greatly increase efficiency.  
2.4.3 Optimization in Queueing 
Optimization is typically used to reduce the cost of operating a system. This is done by 
balancing supply and demand. Optimization of a queueing system strives to not only define how 
many resources are needed to achieve a certain service level, but how these resources should be 
allocated as well. Optimization in the context of emergency departments is typically used for 
scheduling, ensuring that they are not understaffed at peak times and overstaffed at other times. 
Simply by realigning schedules at a Lehigh Valley ED, the average length of stay decreased by 
20% and the wait time without being seen decreased by 58% (Chowdhury, 2018).   
In relation to immigration, this can mean aiming to assign a certain number of judges, 
border patrol officers, and other officials as well as defining how many cases can be processed 
over a certain amount of time. This ultimately keeps costs down by weighing the cost of servers 
against the cost of those waiting. However, it also creates a more efficient system with fewer 
consumers “balking” or failing to enter the system at all. In an asylum processing system, this 
leaves asylum seekers with multiple options. These individuals can either decide that they will not 
be seeking entrance to the United States, or that they can enter illegally. Neither of these options 
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are ideal, as one leaves individuals in potentially dangerous situations and the other leads to an 
increase in illegal entry. 
2.5 Previous Research 
The ever-changing asylum landscape in the United States has made a definitive analysis of 
the immigration process, difficult and often futile. By examining the research performed in this 
and similar areas, we can better understand what areas are important to scholars, as well as how 
we can differentiate the product of our work. 
2.5.1 Qualitative Analyses of the Immigration Process 
Many studies have produced research on the effects of the United States’ approach to 
immigration and asylum. Many of these papers approach the subject from a sociological analysis, 
while few examine the procedures that make up the asylum process and how they can be improved. 
Understanding what the emotional pain points are for asylum seekers opens up the process to a 
review from the perspective of each stakeholder.  
Utržan et al. (2016) examines the immigration process from the perspective of a Syrian 
couple searching for asylum in the United States. The husband in the case met the diagnostic 
criteria for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as well as Major Depressive Disorder after his home 
was burned down by Syrian government agents. Later, when the couple was told by an asylum 
attorney that the application timeline was unknown, tension in their personal relationship 
increased. While the couple was eager to begin work in the United States, work permits took eight 
months to arrive after they filed for asylum. There was minimal communication from the United 
States government, with the couple not knowing “when their asylum interview would be scheduled 
or how long they would have to wait” (Utržan, D. S., & Northwood, A. K., 2017). After finally 
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being scheduled, the asylum interview took only two hours, and ended with the officer noting that 
“a decision would be sent by mail.” The authors’ analysis of the uncertainty behind the asylum 
process gives valuable insight into several psychological effects due to flaws in the asylum process. 
Chavez et al. (2010) and Galli (2017) examine the asylum process from the perspective of 
youth migrants to the United States. Chavez et al. (2010) focus on the immigration of 
unaccompanied minors, exploring the arduous process of both arriving in the United States and 
navigating the subsequent asylum process. They cite Thompson (2008), who claims that “the 
detention and apprehension of an unaccompanied child can involve up to 15 different federal 
agencies,” highlighting the complexity and convolution of the asylum process. The article 
discusses how budget cuts in several agencies have offset workload to other agencies, that left the 
INS/ICE responsible for caregiving of children, but also law enforcement and prosecution of 
aliens. This continued mismanagement of resources led to children detained with “juvenile 
criminal offenders, not being informed of their rights, inaccessibility to legal counsel, wearing 
prison-like uniforms, and being subjected to shackling or handcuffing,” with many also unable to 
maintain contact with their families (Chavez, L., & Menjívar, C., 2017). These issues were present 
before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, but are still apparent today, with 
overcrowding, lack of showers, lack of hot meals, and standing-only cells in current United States 
border camps (Kanno-Youngs, Z., 2019) 
In a similar area, Galli (2017) claims that there are more issues at play in the asylum 
process, primarily regarding unaccompanied youth asylum seekers. The author argues that United 
States border control resources are being abused by some intermediary legal organizations who 
reshape “accounts to meet the demands of the asylum system,” morphing claims from economic 
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immigrants to instead fit the “victimized profile of a refugee,” thus increasing backlog of cases to 
be examined by officers (Galli, 2017). This is an important consideration that may be difficult to 
account for in a mathematical model.  
2.5.2 Quantitative Analyses of the Immigration Process 
While this paper focuses on the asylum process, analyses on both the asylum and refugee 
process are not limited to a qualitative approach, with many quantitative analyses being performed 
that describe more effective ways to resettle, house, and distribute refugees.  
Bansak et al. (2018) used machine learning to predict refugee employment success in the 
United States and Switzerland based on historical data, including “background characteristics, time 
of arrival, assigned location, and measured employment success”. These supervised learning 
models then supplemented an optimization model that aimed to maximize the “the global average 
of the probability that at least one refugee in each family gains employment.” The primary 
constraint was meeting capacity at each respective location. Previous assignment procedures in the 
United States normally only consider the capacity of local resettlement offices, and those in 
Switzerland primarily aim to proportionally spread refugees across regions. The authors model led 
to theoretical “gains of 40 to 70% in refugees’ employment outcomes” relative to previous 
methods of assignment. 
Similarly, in Trapp et al. (2018), the authors use machine learning and integer optimization 
to create a tool that optimizes the placement of refugees based on numerous factors. Services to be 
considered include “refugee processing capacity at affiliates, slots in foreign language instruction 
(such as ESL), school seats for children in the family, and housing availability”. The authors also 
implement constraints that ensure family units are kept together and capacities are appropriately 
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met. The model they developed maximized match quality, in this case to maximize expected 
refugee employment while ensuring the most significant contribution to the economy. Both of 
these papers connect optimization and the refugee crisis in a way that can improve appropriate 
processes, reducing workload for governments while effectively assisting refugees. 
2.5.3 Differentiating Factors 
Instead of examining improvements in the refugee process, like some of the previously 
mentioned papers do, our team will examine potential process improvements and optimizations in 
the defensive asylum process in the United States. This paper will also avoid recommending policy 
changes, but instead recommend optimal levels of resource allocation for any desired service level. 
The goal is to improve processing time, which will arguably benefit all stakeholders. 
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3.0 Methodology 
The purpose of this research was to assess the queues in the expedited removal process for 
defensive asylum seekers at the United States southern border by developing an adaptable web-
based tool for resource allocation. Using queueing theory, simulation, and optimization, the team 
began with an analysis of the current state of the system, simulation of the entire process, and 
development of an objective function based on minimizing the costs imposed by the process. 
The team developed a tool to allocate resources based on the available resources, policies, 
and processes. The tool is intended to be used by key federal decision makers such as the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Analyses 
focused solely on United States southern border ports of entry and subsequent immigration courts 
that process individuals from those sectors. The models have been created with the current state in 
mind but can be used for any time frame. To achieve these goals, we have identified the following 
objectives: 
● Understand important elements of the asylum seeker process through interviews with 
experts in immigration policy and those who have perspective on the asylum process at the 
United States southern border. 
● Analyze data from immigration courts and past reports from the DHS and CBP to 
understand the queuing distribution to ascertain a realistic representation for the tool. 
● Create a simulation using available aggregate data to develop an understanding of the 
process flow and locate points where a large queue may be forming. 
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● Incorporate input data, construct an objective function and determine constraints to create 
an optimization model. This tool utilizes simulation to generate a data set to train the 
regressions. 
● Create a web-based tool that is versatile and adaptable to the changing policies and the 
appropriate agencies. 
3.1 Interviews 
Along with building a final deliverable, the team had the opportunity to interview 
individuals involved in the policy and the politics of immigration. The team interviewed two 
individuals: one discussing immigration integration in Denmark and Sweden and one discussing 
the changes in immigration policy affecting the United States southern border from the perspective 
of Mexico. 
The interviews were conducted in-person with the first subject and over video call with the 
second. Each interview was recorded with permission from each subject. Questions were prepared 
for both subjects along with an introduction to the project our team has been working on. The 
questions for each interview can be found in Appendix H and Appendix I. 
The first subject was Professor Crystal H. Brown, who has been researching immigration 
integration in Sweden and Denmark. Professor Brown earned her Ph.D. in Political Science with 
a focus in the subfields of Comparative Politics, International Relations, and United States Foreign 
Policy from the University of Oregon. Her Ph.D. research was in regards to immigration 
integration in Denmark and Sweden. The goal of interviewing Professor Brown was to gain an 
understanding of immigration integration in a different country and get a better understanding of 
the possible impacts on immigrants from the research of an expert. 
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The second subject was Katya Villarreal, a law student in Mexico who has performed 
research regarding asylum cases in Mexico. She provided us with her knowledge of the policies in 
Mexico and how the migration methods have shifted in Mexico due to the policy changes in the 
United States. Katya’s experiences were of interest to the group because they provide insight to 
the other side of the immigration policies instituted by the United States and effects that may not 
be directly observed in the United States. The team additionally learned more about the framework 
of the laws in Mexico concerning individuals trying to enter the United States. 
3.2 Iterative Design Process 
Throughout many components of the methodology, the team utilized the iterative design 
process, a cyclical process of analyzing and refining a product, to ensure the team was considering 
input from many stakeholders. For example, the optimization model was developed over 
discussions within the team along with a final progress report presentation at the end of the second 
of three terms. The team had the opportunity to present the preliminary design for an optimization 
model in front of key stakeholders including Marc Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary and 
Director of the Office of Immigration Statistics at the Department of Homeland Security and agent 
Ken Blanchard of Customs and Border Protection, along with experts in the fields of queueing 
theory and optimization. From this presentation, the team received detailed feedback to address 
the most pertinent issues affecting the asylum process in the optimization model. Another example 
was testing the user interface, where the team developed multiple iterations based on feedback. 
This allowed the team to understand which features and design elements were most effective and 
make the interface as intuitive as possible. 
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Immigration policy is constantly evolving as new research is conducted and different social 
and political situations arise. After the first trimester of keeping up with policy changes, the team 
advisors suggested putting a pause to the updates on policy and research. This happened by the 
end of October 2019.  
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
The focus of this project is the relationship between resource allocation and the queue 
forming for detained asylum seekers awaiting an immigration court appearance. To address this, 
the team gathered data from multiple sources over the course of the project. The first source was 
an online data tool called the “Immigration Court Backlog Tool” (TRAC Immigration). which 
gives current data on the number and status of court cases across the country. Next, the team 
explored multiple budget yearly reports from the Department of Homeland Security (Annual Flow 
Report) as well as apprehension data from Customs and Border Protection (United States Customs 
and Border Protection, 2020). Finally, the team used case data from the Department of Justice to 
enhance and verify the current data from the Backlog Tool (United States Department of Justice, 
2020). 
The team considered asylum seekers arriving through all ports of entry along the southern 
border. When detailed data was available, the team focused on individual sectors along the 
southern border with data from 2012 to 2019. 
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3.4 Queueing Theory 
The most important aspect of queueing theory that the team explored was the traffic 
intensity of the asylum courts. Traffic intensity for this system is the arrival rate of asylum seekers 
divided by the product of the number of judges in the system and their service rates. 
𝜆
𝑐∗𝜇
 = 
(𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)
(#𝑜𝑓 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠)∗(𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 
The ratio of traffic intensity and its meaning in a system of queues are as follows: 
● When this ratio equals one, this means that, on average, individuals are leaving the 
system just as fast as they are entering it.  
● When the traffic intensity is greater than one means that the queue is increasing.  
● When the traffic intensity is less than one, the system is generally processing 
individuals faster than they are entering the system.  
To change traffic intensity, there are three factors that can be manipulated. These factors 
are the rate at which individuals claim asylum, how long their hearings are, and how many judges 
there are in the system. The Department of Justice directly controls the number of judges, while 
characteristics such as the arrival rate and service rate cannot be easily changed. The arrival rate 
is dependent on factors that are difficult to predict, such as humanitarian crises and disasters in an 
asylum seeker’s native country.  For the service rate, any change to the amount of time an asylum 
seeker has to present their case could result in negative reactions from various organizations. Using 
the traffic intensity formula, the team applied the current state data to get a realistic traffic intensity 
to use as a baseline.  
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3.5 Simulation 
Simulation is a tool used to mimic or imitate real systems and approximate unavailable 
data without affecting the actual system. Simulation combines aspects of inter-arrival time, service 
rate, resource limitations, and other aspects that affect the queues within the process. Simulation 
also allows for changes to be made to the system. Changing aspects such as service rate or resource 
limitation allows for new outputs. Data from the simulation can then be used to adjust and improve 
the real system. 
Using the queueing models as a basis, the team created a simulation reflecting the current 
state of the Defensive Asylum Process using Rockwell Arena Simulation software. This simulation 
used all pieces of the defensive asylum process and their related data, including interarrival times, 
service rate, and resource limitations derived from data from the CBP, DOJ, EOIR, and DHS. 
When developing the simulation, the team made some assumptions for rates and how the team 
thought the system functioned from past research.  
The purpose of this simulation was to ensure our model was accurate and able to be 
replicated using other means of simulation. Because our simulation adequately reflected the 
current state when testing, the team was comfortable using the equations used in the original 
simulation in the open source tool.   
3.6 Capacity Optimization Tool 
The following methods were all vital in creating the Defensive Asylum Capacity 
Optimization Tool (DACOT), both in terms of backend operations, as well as front-end visuals for 
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an optimal user experience. Each of these technologies provided major contributions to the validity 
and usability of the final tool. 
3.6.1 Optimization 
After establishing a queueing system and creating a simulation that adequately represents 
the system, the team applied optimization principles to help achieve an optimal state of the system. 
The decision variables of the optimization problem were the number of judges in each sector. 
Using various cost data, the team developed an objective function that minimizes the 
overall cost of resource usage. Several costs the team considered included the salary of an 
immigration judge and detainment costs including housing, transportation, wellbeing, and 
economic impacts of a large queue, as well as opportunity costs. The specific costs used are defined 
in Appendix E. 
The team then set the objective function to minimize the costs associated with differing 
numbers of judges and, therefore, queue sizes. This also included considerations for constraints 
such as limiting the maximum number of judges in all sectors and the maximum waiting time. 
Finally, the team compared the process flow of the current system to that of what this tool gives to 
determine feasibility of the solution proposed. Based on all aspects mentioned before, the team 
developed the following optimization model, in expanded form: 
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Figure 3. Objective Function and Constraints 
3.6.2 Simulation and Optimization Integration 
Using various Python libraries, including Simpy, Numpy, Pandas, Noisyopt and Scikit-
optimize, the team created a function that simulates the asylum queue for a specified number of 
judges. The simulation-optimizer tests an input value, or decision variable value, and adjusts the 
next guess based on the objective value output. If the objective value can be improved by moving 
in a certain direction, then the simulation-optimizer will continue to search in that direction. If the 
objective value becomes less desirable, then it will search for each variable in the opposing 
direction. This process repeats until an optimal value, within a certain tolerance, is achieved. The 
problem with this method is that it does not inherently achieve a globally optimal solution. To 
achieve a global solution, the effective function to minimize would need to be convex. 
47 
 
Another way to solve this optimization model is to pre-simulate values for various 
combinations of server count and arrival rates to fit a function that predicts wait time in queue and 
number in queue. This allows our program to use more advanced optimization techniques that do 
not limit us to a convex function. Additionally, this has the benefit of solving more quickly for the 
end-user but requires significant pre-computation and introduces additional error in terms of the 
fitted function.  
3.6.3 User Interface 
Creating a workable and intuitive user interface was a process that changed as the model 
itself changed. It was decided that an early, iterative design process would work best to give ample 
time and space for improvements. The changes that can be seen throughout different iterations of 
this interface can be seen in Appendix B. 
The interface iterations were created using an online infographic tool called Visme. Once 
the model was mostly finalized, the design was reviewed by the team and had various users test it 
for intuitivity. The final user interface was developed using HTML and the Bootstrap CSS 
framework, which integrated into our backend frameworks. 
3.6.4 Backend Development 
 We created the backend of our web tool using the Python web framework, “Bottle.” This 
allows us to integrate our frontend technologies, HTML and CSS, and integrate them with our 
backend and optimization methods. 
48 
 
3.7 Shelter Design for Asylum Seekers  
The purpose of this method of the project is to provide a shelter design for asylum seekers 
at the United States southern border. The two main considerations for this design were 
environmental factors and the specific needs of asylum seekers. However, the shelter and 
mechanical analysis are developed for the Rio Grande Valley sector and region in Texas. 
The design parameters and specifications were developed with environmental factors from 
this area only in mind. Several design ideas were generated based on the idea of making shelters 
that were modular. This means that the shelters are constructed in some form of units that can be 
connected. Using a design matrix, the top two designs were evaluated based on its proficiency in 
meeting the parameters and specifications decided earlier. The design with the highest score was 
selected.  
Once a final design was selected, the design was created along with additional pieces for 
mechanical analysis. The detailed analysis portion was completed using ANSYS simulation 
software through Finite Element Analysis (FEA) methods. The main focus for the detailed analysis 
was only on the subfloor support system. Overall analysis of the functionality for the walls, roof, 
and support frames was done as well. The final report for this portion of the project can be found 
in “Addendum: Progressive Modular Shelter Design for Asylum Seekers at the United States 
Southern Border.” 
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4.0 Results  
Each of the methods of this project provided valuable insight to further the team's 
understanding. Through the completion of each method the team gained more knowledge and 
understanding of the whole asylum process. These insights built upon each other, ultimately 
leading to the completion of the web-based tool that could be used by DHS and CBP.  
4.1 Interviews  
One of the major differences between immigration in the United States and in both 
Denmark and Sweden is the general flow of immigrants into the country. This flow and the stress 
on the immigration system and the lawmakers who influence these systems is much more intense 
in the United States than in either of the two aforementioned countries. Additionally, in the United 
States, there are fewer restrictions once asylum is granted compared to once asylum is granted in 
Denmark and Sweden (C. Brown, personal communication, November 20, 2019). Aside from 
getting some perspective concerning the asylum-seeking process in the United States, the team 
was also able to internalize some key humanitarian aspects of Professor Brown’s research process. 
For example, considering opportunity costs carefully in this project.  
Since 2018, the number of asylum applications in Mexico has increased by about 300%, in 
parallel with the increase seen in the United States. Mexico conducts asylum processes as 
administrative processes where the law says that a person does not need to present any documents 
to validate what they say whereas the process in the United states is much more dependent on this 
legal documentation. When an asylum seeker in Mexico claims that there is a threat to their well-
being in their home country, an investigation is conducted through the ministry of foreign affairs 
regarding the socio-political situation of their country of origin, similarly to a credible fear 
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screening in the United States. If an individual in Mexico is being represented by an attorney, the 
fee charged is dependent on where the asylum seeker comes from since that is what will define the 
difficulty of the case. Socially, there have been observations of Mexicans being unwelcoming 
towards Latin American immigrants. It seems that this hostility was intensified by the enactment 
of the “Remain-in-Mexico” Policy in the United States (K. Villarreal, personal communication, 
November 26, 2019). 
4.2 Iterative Design Process 
About halfway through the project, the team had the opportunity to give a Progress Report 
Presentation in front of key stakeholders including Marc Rosenblum, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
and Director of the Office of Immigration Statistics at the Department of Homeland Security and 
Ken Blanchard, from Customs and Border Protection, along with experts in the fields of queueing 
theory and optimization. This Progress Report Presentation displayed the results and research thus 
far and gave an opportunity to revise potential inaccuracies regarding the team’s understanding of 
the United States asylum process.  
In the Progress Report Presentation, the team received valuable feedback regarding the 
integration of queuing theory into the optimization model, the focus of the optimization model 
itself, and the simulated data. In terms of this integration, the experts in the fields of queueing 
theory and optimization validated the team’s approach with feedback on the team’s data and 
graphics in the presentation. For the focus of the model, stakeholders agreed on the benefits of 
getting information regarding the optimal number of judges needed, but suggested that the team 
should not focus so heavily on the costs, since this variable is the most likely to change over time 
and is not as important as the throughput of cases in the system. These comments reinforced the 
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importance of identifying all possible areas of cost including housing, transportation, well-being, 
and opportunity cost, as well as the assumptions of the optimization model. Finally, Marc 
Rosenblum and Ken Blanchard confirmed that the assumptions from the simulation closely 
resemble the reality in terms of the number of people being processed at each stage of the asylum 
process. 
4.3 Data Collection and Analysis  
Using publicly available information from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the team found 
many data points that provided insight into the flow of immigrants that would help create a realistic 
simulation. The first data point the team found was the number of individuals apprehended that 
claimed defensive asylum. By using the proportion of the number of apprehended individuals to 
the number of individuals that claimed defensive asylum, it could be inferred that 45% of 
individuals apprehended would go on to claim defensive asylum. The percentage of individuals 
who had a credible fear was found to be 75% of applicants.  Additionally, defensive asylum is 
granted in 11% of cases and 40% of denied claims will then go on to appeal the decision. Of these 
appeals, 15% are granted asylum after review (Department of Justice, 2020). 
To create the tool, the team used cost data to derive the objective function. Costs were 
divided into two categories: costs of operations, and opportunity costs. Within costs of operations, 
the team considered the salaries of the judges and their teams, housing costs, and detainment costs 
such as beds and transportation. Beds were divided into adult beds and family beds. The main 
sources of this information were the publicly available Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) budget documents. Opportunity costs were 
considered to be the potential loss to the United States economy by having these individuals 
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detained. Opportunity costs are taken into consideration in legal cases that demand retribution. In 
this case, opportunity costs are calculated based upon the minimum wage of each state as of 
January 2020. Though the team is aware that asylum seekers decide to go through this process 
voluntarily, the team decided to consider opportunity costs as a way for the model to consider more 
heavily the cost of an additional day being detained. The full breakdown of the costs can be found 
in Appendix E. 
4.4 Simulation  
Using Rockwell Arena Software, the team developed a working simulation that closely 
resembled the actual asylum process at the United States southern border. Using this simulation, 
the team acquired estimates for the interarrival rates of asylum seekers entering the United States. 
Upon the completion of the original simulation, the team acquired valuable data that would allow 
for the further advancement of the optimization tool. The first thing the team simulated was the 
interarrival times. Using the interarrival rates, a distribution was fit to most closely match the actual 
state of the system. These were then implemented in the web-based tool.  
The team then used the assumed percentages gathered during data collection and analysis 
phase and simulated the actual system. To verify this, the outputs from the simulation including 
the total time in the asylum process system and number of individuals processed were compared 
to aggregate data of the actual system. The simulated metrics closely matched those of the actual 
system and the bottleneck in the system was found to be the hearing with the immigration judge.  
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4.5 Queueing Theory  
To apply queueing theory to this problem, the team first simplified the process flow and 
assumed a “first in, first out” or FIFO queue for the backlog of detained asylum seekers in the 
expedited removal process. However, the larger asylum system, made up of multiple queues, 
follows a “last in, first out” or LIFO priority. While there are multiple queues, the expedited 
removal process queue is the one that is serviced first. The choice to use this type of queueing 
model was based upon the data and information gathered in regard to how asylum seekers are 
processed.  
 
Figure 4. FIFO Queue and LIFO Queue Illustration 
 The following Kendall notation was developed to represent the current state of the asylum 
system in the United States:  
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Figure 5. Expansion of System-Specific Kendall Notation 
Once this was identified, the traffic intensity formula, which is arrivals divided by the 
product of servers and service rate, was used to determine the focus of the optimization model. 
The presented concepts provided a simplified method to evaluate the throughput of this specific 
queue and have a better understanding of how the process flow could be maximized and queue 
length could be reduced. Utilizing the traffic intensity analysis, it became apparent that the most 
feasible option to focus on was the number of judges. This became apparent because the other 
factors included in traffic intensity require policy changes. This focus allowed the team to have a 
more defined goal for the output of the tool.  
4.6 Capacity Optimization Tool 
Initially, we examined the feasibility of using simulation-optimization to run a simulated 
sample with certain decision variables, and used the output performance measure to determine 
which direction to continue optimizing in. However, we soon found that the computational 
requirements and performance of this method on the user’s end would be undesirable. We looked 
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into other optimization methods that would provide an approximate answer while improving 
usability for end users. 
4.6.1 Simulated Data Analysis 
Our team decided to pre-process data to approximate outputs based on input variables. This 
involved simulating 50,000 samples, each with varying numbers of judges, arrival rates, and initial 
queue sizes. We selected 50,000 samples to accurately train our regression. While this presented 
long computational times in the beginning, the benefits were apparent in later solutions. This 
approach allowed us to fit functions to the independent variables that would output an approximate 
average wait time and average queue size. First, to determine the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables, we created scatter plots and determined correlations between 
variables. 
Figure 6. demonstrates that, with a larger initial queue and a smaller number of judges, the 
average wait time of entities in the initial queue increases. The average wait time for entities in the 
initial queue remains very large since we assume that entities in this queue have already been there 
for a relatively large random value of time, characterized in our simulation by a Poisson 
distribution with lambda of 60 days, based on requirements outlined by the director of the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (McHenry, 2018). 
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Number of samples = 679 (limited to simulated data points with an interarrival between 0 and 0.5 minutes) 
Figure 6. Relationship between Initial Queue, Judges, and Average Wait Times 
 
 
Number of samples = 511 (limited to simulated data points with a number of judges between 500 and 650 judges) 
Figure 7. Relationship between Initial Queue, Interarrival Times, and Average Wait Times 
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Number of samples = 470 (limited to simulated data points with an Initial Queue between 2000 and 2200 entities) 
Figure 8. Relationship between Judges, Intearrival Time, and Average Wait Times 
 
Linear Correlation 
Table 
Initial Queue Ave. 
Wait 
New Arrivals Ave. 
Wait 
Ave. Queue Size 
Number of Judges -0.756 -0.183 -0.137 
Interarrival Rate -0.003 -0.313 -0.283 
Initial Queue 0.487 0.001 0.000 
Note: This correlation matrix compares R-squared values of Number of Judges, Interarrival time and Initial Queue Size against the 
initial queue average wait time, the new arrival average wait time, and the average queue size. 
Table 1. Linear Correlation Table 
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Graphs demonstrating the relationship between the predictors “number of judges,” 
“interarrival,” “initial queue” and the regressands “new arrival average wait time” and “average 
queue size” are covered in Appendix J. 
After determining that there were satisfactory conditions to fit a line and create a 
multivariate function that would output what we desired, we began testing different 
transformations and combinations of variables that would yield three approximating functions: one 
to predict initial queue entity average wait time, one for new arrivals entity average wait time, and 
one to predicted average queue size. 
4.6.2 Regressions 
To maximize efficiency with the webtool, we had to develop formulas that would 
approximate certain simulation-dependent values, including average waiting time of initial queue 
entities, average waiting time of new arrivals, and average number in queue. The regression we 
fitted to predict average waiting time in queue for members of the initial queue was a regression 
using a second order polynomial. This resulted in the following regression with an R-squared value 
of 0.9127: 
 
The regressions for predicting new arrival wait time and average queue size can be found below. 
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The new arrival average wait regression has an R-squared value of 0.6176, and the average queue 
size regression has an R-squared value of 0.6014. These values could be improved using a 
regression tree or similar technique to make a more flexible model, considering that after a certain 
stage simulated data point values plateau. 
4.6.3 User Interface 
The team gave input as a group considering all aspects of the model. As the simulation 
optimization model began to progress, the interface concept did as well. Everything from the 
colors, to the font, to the style of input was critiqued. A first color consideration was to use the 
same colors as those in the official website of the DHS. From the first concept to the second, the 
colors greatly changed to become more aesthetically pleasing and professional. Along with this, 
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the team decided that displaying results on three separate tabs would make the inputs and outputs 
much easier to look at and analyze without overwhelming users.  
The second model was much different than the first and it was designed to be much more 
practical for users. From this point, the new changes focused on ensuring that the interface 
reflected the input requirements and output types of the model itself. From the second model to 
the third, a lighter color was chosen for the background of the interface, to favor contrast. In the 
third iteration the team also created a greater visual differentiation between the user input and 
outputs and adapted to the model by creating separation between immigration sectors. Finally, the 
team decided to add key information and definitions about each input. This was done by creating 
clickable icons that display the information once selected so that the user has access to the 
information, but it does not overload the screen once it has been used. This final result can be seen 
in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. DACOT Final User Interface 
The reason why we decided to work in parallel with the model instead of waiting for a final 
product to be decided was that by working on the user interface early on, the team was able to 
provide a visual idea of the potential final products. This was particularly important since the team 
was able to receive feedback and perfect different aspects of the design that in some cases even 
affected the result that the team was looking for from the model itself.   
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5.0 Conclusion  
The purpose of this research and the development of a resource allocation tool was to assess 
the queue of the expedited removal process for defensive asylum seekers at the United States 
southern border. With a large backlog of over one million cases as of 2019, the intention for this 
tool is to try and use government resources where needed so that more people can be processed 
and spend less time in detainment. Since the tool includes factors on cost for being detained in 
conjunction with average wait times, the objective is to reduce this cost as much as possible. Since 
each sector has a varying number of caseloads going into each court, allocating to best support 
these caseloads would aid in the reduction of wait time for asylum seekers in detention centers. By 
reducing wait times, both the United States government and asylum seekers can benefit from a 
more efficient flow through the process. 
Through the use of data analysis, simulation, optimization, and regression analysis, the 
team developed a tool that uses several technologies that often see use in private industry, but uses 
in the public sector, while not unheard of, are rare. Also unique is the use of a web interface to 
facilitate usability by United States Government officials. While the tool is derived from 
engineering principles, it is intended to aid in a humanitarian effort that has not previously received 
such support. 
This tool has been designed for the use by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, 
as they are the agencies that assign and hire Immigration judges. Along with them, the tool also 
has applications for the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection. Information provided by this tool will allow for 
accurate predictions of the backlog, based on the current resource allocation set by the Department 
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of Justice and Executive Office for Immigration Review. This would allow for these agencies to 
adjust their resource allocation accordingly. 
The produced results have implications that extend beyond the government, affecting 
asylum seekers as well. This tool will allow for more individuals to be processed through the 
system. This hopefully leads to less overall time in the asylum system, an outcome beneficial to 
both parties involved. While this tool is looking to reduce time in the system, it is not aimed at 
changing the overall process or decisions that are made.  
In practical use, this tool offers a reasonable way to predict how to best prepare for the 
number of asylum seekers that need to be processed in the United States within the simulated time 
frame. Along with advising an appropriate distribution of judges, this tool also aids in the 
prediction of how many asylum seekers reside within the country while they await their asylum 
verdict. Using these numbers, allocation of other resources such as housing, could be inferred from 
the results of our tool. Accurate planning of resource distribution will reduce costs for the United 
States by preventing resource waste or additional costs that come with sudden surge of arrivals. 
Over time, using an appropriately allocated number of judges, the United States will need to devote 
less resources to asylum seekers, as they will be processed more efficiently and be detained for a 
shorter period of time.  
It is important to consider future perspectives of this research as well as continued 
development of the current work. Future projects could replicate the methodology of this paper 
and fit the tool to updated data. Future research could also provide a detailed cost-benefit analysis 
of the implications of hiring an additional judge versus keeping a specific number of people 
detained for an additional time period. This could potentially provide insight on the marginal 
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benefit of hiring more judges. This benefit is considered not only from an economic perspective 
but also a humanitarian one. Future research could potentially look deeper into providing a more 
detailed analysis of deprivation costs happening as a result of being detained. At the same time, 
this research has the potential to be replicated in essence to analyze a different country’s migratory 
systems and provide a web-based tool to advise policy.  
Other changes that would create an even stronger output or tool would be related to the 
technology and data the tool uses to build an optimized allocation. Some of these changes would 
include expansions on the pattern prediction used when analyzing the simulated asylum seeker 
flow. Some areas that should be examined include a longer simulation period, examination of 
seasonality effects, and a more precise allocation of judges over different timeframes and macro 
changes in immigration flow. A longer simulation period would benefit the model by accounting 
for the long-term effects of a certain resource allocation. Examining seasonal effects would make 
a more robust model that assigns judges over time while accounting for many varying immigration 
rates. This, along with considerations for the macro flow of immigrants and the fact that judges 
are traditionally not appointed for a short period of time would help create a cost function that is 
more accurate in the long term. 
This project was conceived with the sentiment of helping asylum seekers. Through the 
course of this project it became evident that this would provide a joint benefit to the United States 
Government, by improving their judicial resource allocation. Keeping this relationship in mind, 
we created a tool that keeps the interests of both groups at the forefront. We hope this tool is 
implemented by the involved agencies and sees its full humanitarian potential reached.  
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6.0 Reflections 
Through the completion of any project, adversity will arise in many forms and this project 
was no different. The first problem the team faced was defining the problem. The first step to 
overcoming this obstacle was to define a proper scope. The southern border faces many issues 
regarding asylum, so narrowing down which aspect to hone this research on was a massive step in 
defining this problem. Through careful and meticulous research, the team scoped the project to 
focus exclusively on the expedited removal process. This scope was chosen due to its current 
prevalence in the United States, and due to its encapsulation of many detained individuals. 
The next challenge that the team addressed was that of the multiple stakeholders in the 
problem. Within this project there are two major stakeholders: the asylees and the United States 
federal agencies. Throughout the course of this project, it was critical to maintain a neutral position. 
However due to the complex nature of the subject, the team struggled to find accurate and unbiased 
sources. This required us to use publicly available data released by government agencies as our 
primary data source. The team limited the scope to help provide information to assist decision 
makers rather than provide policy recommendations. Each variable, such as increasing the number 
of judges, reducing arrival rates, or reducing processing time, has repercussions that go far beyond 
economic concerns. Furthermore, immigration flows are affected by innumerable factors, making 
them very difficult to predict. An example of the dynamic nature of these flows is the sudden rise 
in people claiming asylum in the United States in the past few years.  
In doing this project, the team felt that engineering knowledge could be applicable to help 
ease humanitarian concerns. However, it was important to keep in mind that the repercussions 
associated with decision making in a project like this affects the lives of real people more than it 
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would if the team was optimizing a production line in a factory or a service such as waiting in line 
in a cafe. At the same time, this tool has potential to be applicable to any country that presents 
large inflows of immigrants every year.  
The model is versatile because it can be applied to specific sectors based on the available 
data and can utilize data from past years to give a reasonable allocation of resources. This tool 
focuses on optimizing the broad problem of finding the best allocation of resources to help a 
random process move more steadily. For the asylum process, this tool would need to be adjusted 
over time as policy changes and definitions change to fit the current process. 
Overall, the project was a great learning experience, giving the opportunity to tackle a 
humanitarian situation through the lens of an engineer as well as strengthen the communication, 
problem-solving, and interpersonal skills within the team. We developed a holistic understanding 
of the problem through the team's diverse perspectives and by communicating with experts in 
optimization and immigration policy. This required research in literature of immigration policy 
and many United States government agencies and the processes involved in immigration beyond 
regular coursework. Although we did not have a direct sponsor, the team communicated with 
experts in queueing theory and optimization as well as stakeholders (DHS and CBP) to develop 
and iterate a tool that was intuitive and captured the asylum process realistically. 
The entire group was evidently fully invested and very passionate about this cause. The 
level of commitment that each individual possessed was very conducive to the amount of personal 
motivation this project required. This made it easy to stay on top of the established schedule and 
ensure that every group member was aware of each meeting time. Another element that kept each 
member accountable was establishing a project tracker. The team would decide what needed to be 
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done by the end of the term and assign an approximate timeline for these goals. Referencing this 
project tracker made it easy to know if the progress was on time, behind, or ahead of schedule. 
These expectations were documented at each meeting in the agenda for that meeting.  
The last aspect of this group that allowed for successful completion of this problem was 
communication. The topic of immigration in the United States in general is a highly debated 
subject that many individuals have very strong feelings about. Each member made an active effort 
to make sure each voice was heard to remove biases, specifically when writing. Each member was 
listened to when they had an idea or a question, and mediated conversations between members to 
ensure both sides were heard and thoroughly considered. This level of communication also meant 
that each member was able to have times when they facilitated conversations in the group and took 
the lead when it came to certain aspects of the project.   
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8.3 Appendix C: Federal Policy Timeline 
Below are screenshot examples of the data input for the generated timeline. The link below 
accesses the complete timeline: 
https://cdn.knightlab.com/libs/timeline3/latest/embed/index.html?source=16tCX-
Xww_sGWi3NSVi_YFMbsI51Cwf6u98bZO_f6eSQ&font=Default&lang=en&initial_zoom=2&
height=650 
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8.4 Appendix D: Python Code for Optimization Tool 
main.py 
 
from bottle import get, post, request, Bottle, run, route,\ 
  template, debug, static_file 
import optim 
import os, sys 
import sectorlists as sl 
import warnings 
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="numpy.dtype size changed") 
warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="numpy.ufunc size changed") 
 
dirname = os.path.dirname(sys.argv[0]) 
 
@route('/static/<filename:re:.*\.css>') 
def send_css(filename): 
 return static_file(filename, root=dirname+'/static/asset/css') 
 
@route('/static/<filename:re:.*\.js>') 
def send_js(filename): 
 return static_file(filename, root=dirname+'/static/asset/js') 
 
@get('/') # or @route('/login') 
def index():  
    sector_input = { 
        #1: arrival, 2: judge cost, 3:  
        "sd1" : 0.233, "sd2" : 163912.23, "sd3" : 737.87, "sd4" : 1000, 
        "ec1" : 0.300, "ec2" : 156935.2, "ec3" : 737.87, "ec4" : 1000, 
        "yu1" : 0.417, "yu2" : 151343.7, "yu3" : 642.29, "yu4" : 1000, 
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        "tu1" : 0.167, "tu2" : 153269.4, "tu3" : 554.40, "tu4" : 1000, 
        "ep1" : 0.171, "ep2" : 150034.5, "ep3" : 563.64, "ep4" : 1000, 
        "bb1" : 1.167, "bb2" : 153874.15, "bb3" : 523.19, "bb4" : 1000, 
        "dr1" : 0.333, "dr2" : 153874.15, "dr3" : 523.19, "dr4" : 1000, 
        "la1" : 0.283, "la2" : 153874.15, "la3" : 523.19, "la4" : 1000, 
        "ma1" : 0.054, "ma2" : 157434.75, "ma3" : 523.19, "ma4" : 1000, 
        } 
    maxj = 1500 
    maxw = 50000000 
    sector_output = { 
        "sd5" : "", 
        "ec5" : "", 
        "yu5" : "", 
        "tu5" : "", 
        "ep5" : "", 
        "bb5" : "", 
        "dr5" : "", 
        "la5" : "", 
        "ma5" : "" 
        } 
    return template('index', sector_input = sector_input, maxj=maxj, 
maxw=maxw, blocked = '', sector_output = sector_output) 
 
@post('/') # or @route('/login', method='POST') 
def submit(): 
    dataForOptim = sl.defineFormVariables() 
    inputData = dataForOptim[0] 
    data = dataForOptim[1] 
    maxJudges = dataForOptim[2] 
    maxWait = dataForOptim[3] 
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    initq = 10000 
    aResult = optim.runOptimizer(data,maxJudges,maxWait,initq) 
    return template('index', sector_input = inputData, maxj=maxJudges, 
maxw=maxWait, blocked = '', sector_output = aResult) 
    #return "1" 
 
run(host='localhost', port=8080, debug=True) 
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optim.py 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Thu Feb  6 13:56:15 2020 
 
@author: peter 
""" 
import scipy 
from scipy.optimize import minimize 
import numpy as np 
import warnings 
#warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="numpy.dtype size changed") 
#warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", message="numpy.ufunc size changed") 
# data = [(0.233, 163912.23, 737.87, 0),  
#         (0.300, 156935, 737.87, 0),  
#         (0.417, 151343, 642.29, 0),  
#         (0.167, 153269, 554.40, 0),  
#         (0.171, 150034, 563.64, 0),  
#         (1.167, 153874, 523.19, 0),  
#         (0.333, 153874, 523.19, 0),  
#         (0.283, 153874, 523.19, 0),  
#         (0.054, 157434, 523.19, 0)] 
# maxj = 1500 
# maxw = 10000000 
# initq = 10000 
 
def runOptimizer(slist,maxj,maxw,initq): 
    def objective(x): 
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        output = 0 
        counti = 0 
        for i in slist: 
            a_s = i[0] 
            c_s = i[1] 
            #print(c_s) 
            d_s = i[2] 
            q_s = i[3] 
            RegressionQueueSize = 50982.95145862 + 5.43838624 * x[counti] 
+ 83823.01879845 * a_s + 8.24805887 * q_s + 6.89860217 * x[counti] * a_s - 
0.00029366 * x[counti] * q_s - 0.0840711 * a_s * q_s - 13476.94189917 * 
np.log10(x[counti]) - 57442.04510548 * np.log10(a_s) - 6652.16407871 * 
np.log10(q_s) - 0.00277133 * x[counti]**2 - 15249.17958746 * a_s**2 - 0.00106309 
* q_s**2 
            RegressionNewArrivals = 18018.722703 + 2.49300473 * x[counti] 
+ 9882.65967397 * a_s + 0.77200657 * q_s + 1.34956612 * x[counti] * a_s - 
0.0000341 * x[counti] * q_s - 0.00937123 * a_s * q_s - 3767.42548942 * 
np.log10(x[counti]) - 7567.58506682 * np.log10(a_s) - 593.75981837 * 
np.log10(q_s) - 0.00073131 * x[counti]**2 - 1851.22375 * a_s**2 - 0.00010115 * 
q_s**2 
            RegressionInitQueue = 86864.94001475 - 0.75857617 * x[counti] 
- 8.6370084 * a_s + 0.09767358 * q_s + 0.00022441 * x[counti]**2 + 2.50908228 
* a_s**2 + 0.00000428 * q_s**2 
 
            #print(d_s) 
            #print(x[0]) Average Wait = - 32390.80503581 - 6.6252843 
Judges + 93576.1235365 Interarrival + 40.07827326 Initial Queue 
            #output += c_s * x[counti] + d_s * 0.000694444 * ( -
32390.80504 - 6.625284296 * x[counti] + 93576.12354 * a_s + 40.07827326 * initq 
) * \ 
                #(1044.52465861 - 7163.86414719 * np.log10(a_s) + 
3933.95169603 * np.log10(initq) - 3669.95787844 * np.log10(x[counti])) 
            output += c_s * x[counti] + d_s * ( (RegressionInitQueue) * 
(RegressionNewArrivals) + q_s * (RegressionQueueSize) ) 
            counti += 1 
        #print(output) 
        return output 
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    def x_constr(x): 
        return x[0] + x[1] + x[2] + x[3] + x[4] + x[5] + x[6] + x[7] + 
x[8] 
     
    def w_constr_sd(x): 
        return x[0] 
    def w_constr_ec(x): 
        return x[1] 
    def w_constr_yu(x): 
        return x[2] 
    def w_constr_tu(x): 
        return x[3] 
    def w_constr_ep(x): 
        return x[4] 
    def w_constr_bb(x): 
        return x[5] 
    def w_constr_dr(x): 
        return x[6] 
    def w_constr_la(x): 
        return x[7] 
    def w_constr_ma(x): 
        return x[8] 
     
    #judgeconstr = scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(x_constr, 1, maxj) 
    #waittimeconstr = scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr, 0, 
maxw) 
     
    cons = (scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(x_constr, 1, maxj), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_sd, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_ec, 0, maxw), 
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            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_yu, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_tu, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_ep, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_bb, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_dr, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_la, 0, maxw), 
            scipy.optimize.NonlinearConstraint(w_constr_ma, 0, maxw) 
            ) 
     
    # cons2 = ({'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[0] - x[1] - x[2] - 
x[3] - x[4] - x[5] - x[6] - x[7] - x[8] + maxj}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[0] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[1] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[2] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[3] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[4] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[5] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[6] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[7] + maxw}, 
    #          {'type': 'ineq', 'fun': lambda x:  -x[8] + maxw}, 
    #          ) 
     
    #bounds = 
[(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,10000),(0,100
00),(0,10000)] 
     
    output = minimize(objective, 
x0=(100,100,100,100,100,100,100,100,100), method='COBYLA', constraints=cons) 
    #return output 
    return { 
        "sd5" : round(output.x[0]), 
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        "ec5" : round(output.x[1]), 
        "yu5" : round(output.x[2]), 
        "tu5" : round(output.x[3]), 
        "ep5" : round(output.x[4]), 
        "bb5" : round(output.x[5]), 
        "dr5" : round(output.x[6]), 
        "la5" : round(output.x[7]), 
        "ma5" : round(output.x[8]) 
        } 
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sectorlists.py 
 
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- 
""" 
Created on Sun Feb  9 14:34:49 2020 
 
@author: Peter Beretich 
""" 
from bottle import request 
def generateSectors(): 
    list_of_sectors = ["sd","ec","yu","tu","ep","bb","dr","la","ma"] 
    list_of_entries = [] 
    for sector in list_of_sectors: 
        for i in range(4): 
            list_of_entries.append(sector + str(i+1)) 
     
    print(", ".join(list_of_entries)) 
     
    for entry in list_of_entries: 
        #globals()[entry] = float(request.forms.get(str(entry))) 
        print(str(entry) +" = float(request.forms.get(\""+ str(entry) 
+"\"))") 
         
        #sd1 = float(request.forms.get("sd1")) 
        #sd2 = float(request.forms.get("sd2")) 
         
#Define form variables 
def defineFormVariables(): 
    sd1 = float(request.forms.get("sd1")) 
    sd2 = float(request.forms.get("sd2")) 
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    sd3 = float(request.forms.get("sd3")) 
    sd4 = float(request.forms.get("sd4")) 
    #sd4 = request.forms.get("sd4") 
    ec1 = float(request.forms.get("ec1")) 
    ec2 = float(request.forms.get("ec2")) 
    ec3 = float(request.forms.get("ec3")) 
    ec4 = float(request.forms.get("ec4")) 
    #ec4 = request.forms.get("ec4") 
    yu1 = float(request.forms.get("yu1")) 
    yu2 = float(request.forms.get("yu2")) 
    yu3 = float(request.forms.get("yu3")) 
    yu4 = float(request.forms.get("yu4")) 
    #yu4 = request.forms.get("yu4") 
    tu1 = float(request.forms.get("tu1")) 
    tu2 = float(request.forms.get("tu2")) 
    tu3 = float(request.forms.get("tu3")) 
    tu4 = float(request.forms.get("tu4")) 
    #tu4 = request.forms.get("tu4") 
    ep1 = float(request.forms.get("ep1")) 
    ep2 = float(request.forms.get("ep2")) 
    ep3 = float(request.forms.get("ep3")) 
    ep4 = float(request.forms.get("ep4")) 
    #ep4 = request.forms.get("ep4") 
    bb1 = float(request.forms.get("bb1")) 
    bb2 = float(request.forms.get("bb2")) 
    bb3 = float(request.forms.get("bb3")) 
    bb4 = float(request.forms.get("bb4")) 
    #bb4 = request.forms.get("bb4") 
    dr1 = float(request.forms.get("dr1")) 
    dr2 = float(request.forms.get("dr2")) 
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    dr3 = float(request.forms.get("dr3")) 
    dr4 = float(request.forms.get("dr4")) 
    #dr4 = request.forms.get("dr4") 
    la1 = float(request.forms.get("la1")) 
    la2 = float(request.forms.get("la2")) 
    la3 = float(request.forms.get("la3")) 
    la4 = float(request.forms.get("la4")) 
    #la4 = request.forms.get("la4") 
    ma1 = float(request.forms.get("ma1")) 
    ma2 = float(request.forms.get("ma2")) 
    ma3 = float(request.forms.get("ma3")) 
    ma4 = float(request.forms.get("ma4")) 
    #ma4 = request.forms.get("ma4") 
     
    #print(type(ma1)) 
     
    maxWait = float(request.forms.get("maxw")) 
    maxJudges = float(request.forms.get("maxj")) 
     
    dataNames = [("sd1", "sd2", "sd3", "sd4"),  
                 ("ec1", "ec2", "ec3", "ec4"),  
                 ("yu1", "yu2", "yu3", "yu4"),  
                 ("tu1", "tu2", "tu3", "tu4"),  
                 ("ep1", "ep2", "ep3", "ep4"),  
                 ("bb1", "bb2", "bb3", "bb4"),  
                 ("dr1", "dr2", "dr3", "dr4"),  
                 ("la1", "la2", "la3", "la4"),  
                 ("ma1", "ma2", "ma3", "ma4")] 
     
    data = [(sd1, sd2, sd3, sd4),  
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            (ec1, ec2, ec3, ec4),  
            (yu1, yu2, yu3, yu4),  
            (tu1, tu2, tu3, tu4),  
            (ep1, ep2, ep3, ep4),  
            (bb1, bb2, bb3, bb4),  
            (dr1, dr2, dr3, dr4),  
            (la1, la2, la3, la4),  
            (ma1, ma2, ma3, ma4)] 
     
    dataNames2 = [item for t in dataNames for item in t]  
    data2 = [item for t in data for item in t]  
     
    userInput = dict(zip(dataNames2, data2)) 
    return (userInput, data, maxJudges, maxWait) 
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views / index.tpl 
#Template 
<head> 
 <meta charset="utf-8"> 
 <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="IE=edge"> 
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-
scale=1"> 
 <meta name="description" content="Bottle web project template"> 
 <meta name="author" content="datamate"> 
 <link rel="icon" href="/static/favicon.ico">   
 <title>Asylum Resource Allocation Tool</title> 
 <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" 
href="/static/bootstrap.min.css"> 
 <script type="text/javascript" 
src="/static/jquery.min.js"></script> 
 <script type="text/javascript" 
src="/static/bootstrap.min.js"></script>  
</head> 
<br> 
<div class="col-8 mx-auto"> 
<h1 class="text-center">Welcome to the Defensive Asylum Capacity 
Optimization Tool (DACOT)</h1> 
 
<p class="text-center">Please insert relevant information below and hit 
run to optimize resource allocation</p> 
<br> 
<form action="/" method="post"> 
 
<table class="table text-center"> 
  <thead> 
    <tr> 
      <th scope="col">Sector</th> 
      <th scope="col">Inter-Arrival Time</th> 
      <th scope="col">Annual Judge Salary</th> 
      <th scope="col">Cost of detaining</th> 
      <th scope="col">Initial Queue</th> 
   <th scope="col">Number of judges</th> 
    </tr> 
  </thead> 
  <tbody> 
    <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  San Diego 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="sd1" 
name="sd1" value="{{sector_input["sd1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="sd2" 
name="sd2" value="{{sector_input["sd2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
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  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="sd3" 
name="sd3" value="{{sector_input["sd3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="sd3" 
name="sd4" value="{{sector_input["sd4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="sd5" 
name="sd5" value="{{sector_output["sd5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  El Centro 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ec1" 
name="ec1" value="{{sector_input["ec1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ec2" 
name="ec2" value="{{sector_input["ec2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ec3" 
name="ec3" value="{{sector_input["ec3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ec4" 
name="ec4" value="{{sector_input["ec4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ec5" 
name="ec5" value="{{sector_output["ec5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  Yuma 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="yu1" 
name="yu1" value="{{sector_input["yu1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="yu2" 
name="yu2" value="{{sector_input["yu2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="yu3" 
name="yu3" value="{{sector_input["yu3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
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  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="yu4" 
name="yu4" value="{{sector_input["yu4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="yu5" 
name="yu5" value="{{sector_output["yu5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  Tucson 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="tu1" 
name="tu1" value="{{sector_input["tu1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="tu2" 
name="tu2" value="{{sector_input["tu2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="tu3" 
name="tu3" value="{{sector_input["tu3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="tu4" 
name="tu4" value="{{sector_input["tu4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="tu5" 
name="tu5" value="{{sector_output["tu5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  El Paso 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ep1" 
name="ep1" value="{{sector_input["ep1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ep2" 
name="ep2" value="{{sector_input["ep2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ep3" 
name="ep3" value="{{sector_input["ep3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ep4" 
name="ep4" value="{{sector_input["ep4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
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  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ep5" 
name="ep5" value="{{sector_output["ep5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  Big Bend 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="bb1" 
name="bb1" value="{{sector_input["bb1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="bb2" 
name="bb2" value="{{sector_input["bb2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="bb3" 
name="bb3" value="{{sector_input["bb3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="bb4" 
name="bb4" value="{{sector_input["bb4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="bb5" 
name="bb5" value="{{sector_output["bb5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  Del Rio 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="dr1" 
name="dr1" value="{{sector_input["dr1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="dr2" 
name="dr2" value="{{sector_input["dr2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="dr3" 
name="dr3" value="{{sector_input["dr3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="dr4" 
name="dr4" value="{{sector_input["dr4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="dr5" 
name="dr5" value="{{sector_output["dr5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
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      <th scope="col"> 
  Laredo 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="la1" 
name="la1" value="{{sector_input["la1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="la2" 
name="la2" value="{{sector_input["la2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="la3" 
name="la3" value="{{sector_input["la3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="la4" 
name="la4" value="{{sector_input["la4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="la5" 
name="la5" value="{{sector_output["la5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
 <tr> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  McAllen 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ma1" 
name="ma1" value="{{sector_input["ma1"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ma2" 
name="ma2" value="{{sector_input["ma2"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
      <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ma3" 
name="ma3" value="{{sector_input["ma3"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ma4" 
name="ma4" value="{{sector_input["ma4"]}}" {{blocked}}/> 
   </th> 
   <th scope="col"> 
  <INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="ma5" 
name="ma5" value="{{sector_output["ma5"]}}" disabled/> 
   </th> 
    </tr> 
  </tbody> 
</table> 
 
<table class="table"> 
    <tbody> 
        <tr> 
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            <th scope="row" class="text-right">Maximum Number of 
Judges:</th> 
            <td><INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="maxj" 
name="maxj" value="{{maxj}}" {{blocked}}/></td> 
        </tr> 
        <tr> 
            <th scope="row" class="text-right">Maximum Allowed Wait Time 
in Queue:</th> 
            <td><INPUT type="number" class="form-control" id="maxw" 
name="maxw" value="{{maxw}}" {{blocked}}/></td> 
        </tr> 
    </tbody> 
</table> 
<div class="text-right"> 
<INPUT class="btn btn-success" type="submit" value="Submit"/> 
</form> 
</div> 
     
<div id="target"></div> 
</div> 
<br> 
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8.5 Appendix E: Table of Aggregate Cost Data by Sector for Optimization Tool 
Below are the cost estimates used as part of the optimization tool. 
 
A link to the spreadsheet for the cost data shown above can be found at the following location:  
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_JoKBE5eZ0Ew9FmIylcyaEsbcT-
fN7dfroraGGTQvq0/edit#gid=0  
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8.6 Appendix F: Glossary of Asylum Seeker Process Terms 
Throughout the project, the team gathered and defined key terms based on information 
from government organizations to provide a better understanding of the asylum seeker process and 
guidelines. The list can be viewed at the link below: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1_b2xvq3lWIPfpzm1z3AMrfAsisx8Wa0VdpKS6
oEpvDE/edit#gid=0 
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8.7 Appendix G: Simulation Assumptions 
Assumptions for the Simulation 
45% of apprehended individuals claim defensive asylum 
Credible fear is found 75% of the time 
11% of individuals are granted asylum 
Of the 89% denied, 60% appeal the decision 
15% of appeals are overruled 
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8.8 Appendix H: Interview Questions for Katya Villarreal 
Research process: 
1. Tell us about your research questions, what is the specific purpose of your thesis? 
2. What research methods have you used for your thesis? 
a. What roadblocks did you face that changed the direction of your research? 
3. What downfalls or limitations do these research methods have? 
a. How did you overcome these challenges? 
Mexico’s situation: 
4. What is the current situation with immigrants from central america coming to mexico? 
5. How did Mexico react to the caravans of immigrants? 
6. What are some issues associated with immigration that Mexico is currently facing? 
a. What possible solutions have been attempted and were they successful? 
b. What do you think would be a better alternative? 
Legally: 
7. Legally, what happens when an immigrant requests asylum in Mexico? 
8. Legally, what happens when someone is deported from the U.S and is sent back to Mexico? 
United States Mexico relations: 
9. What is Mexico’s view of the United States’s immigration policy? 
a. Has this drastically changed in recent years? 
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10. What was Mexico’s reaction to the policy of asylum seekers having to request asylum in 
Mexico first, if they aspire to request asylum in the United States? 
11. Have there been any impacts in relation to the “Remain in Mexico” policy? 
U.N. in relation to immigration: 
12. In your experience, how does the U.N. impact the immigration policies, human rights 
policies, etc. of other countries? 
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8.9 Appendix I: Interview Questions for Crystal Brown 
Introduction: 
1. Tell us more about your experience and insights about immigration integration in Sweden 
and Denmark? 
a. Were there defined processes or paths immigrants could take? 
b. How did support organizations help improve immigrant integration into society? 
Comparing her research to the United States 
2. What are some similarities and differences you see between integration in Sweden and 
Denmark compared to integration in the United States? 
a. In relation to the integration process? 
3. In your research question about non-Western immigrants generally NOT succeeding 
socially and economically in Denmark and Sweden, what parallels would you expect to 
find in America, if any? 
Qualitative vs quantitative data 
4. What research methods have you used to gain quantitative data on immigration? 
a. What downfalls or limitations do these research methods have? 
b. When gathering data whether through surveying, small interviews, or maybe 
polling, what were some of the challenges you faced in being able to gather the 
data? 
c. Follow-Up: How did you overcome these challenges? 
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5. We want to understand how we can quantify the unaccounted benefits such as happiness, 
quality of life, etc. that our tool could bring, how would you advise us to go about it? 
 
Research process/impacts 
6. How did your approach to immigration integration change or evolve throughout the 
research process? 
7. How did your perspective and experience change through your research in immigration 
integration? 
 
Hypothetical situations/impacts of our research 
8. Do you think that if the immigrant population increased within any country, there would 
be any impacts on the already existing immigrant population?  
a. Would it have a more positive or negative impact?  
9. What is the effect of efficiency on how migrants adapt and integrate to their new home? 
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8.10 Appendix J: Graphs Showing Relationships between Number of Judges, 
Interarrival Time, Initial Queue Size, and New Arrival Average Wait Time and 
Average Queue Size prediction 
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8.11 Appendix K: Regressions for New Arrival Average Wait Time and 
Average Queue Size prediction 
 
R-Squared = 0.6176 
 
R-squared = 0.6014 
 
